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TRIBUNAL DISCOURSE AND 
INTERCOURSE: HOW THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS SPEAK TO ONE 
ANOTHER 
Patricia M. Wald*
Abstract: This Article analyzes the development of a common law for 
international tribunals through the interpretation of applicable trea-
ties and the interpretation of customary law—a decidedly difªcult and 
amorphous process. The author notes there has been signiªcant de-
velopment in the common law of the tribunals, but that there is still a 
long way to go, especially on the issue of when a court should simply 
interpret or apply existing law and when it should “legislate” or create 
new law.  The Article also examines the less formal rules and practices 
beyond formal judgments, the “soft” law and practices, which are in-
dispensable to the continued existence of international tribunals. 
This Article suggests “soft” law and practices may turn out to be more 
inºuential in the overall record of these courts than the jurispru-
dence. 
I. Thoughts on the Relationship Between  
Common Law and Customary Law 
 First, I want to clarify the relationship between what we think of 
as common law and the customary law norms that restrain interna-
tional criminal courts in varying degrees. In our Anglo-Saxon legal 
tradition, common law develops from the accretion of court decisions 
dealing with similar problems, and through a process of reªning, ex-
panding, and distinguishing among those situations, principles of law 
emerge. Sometimes these principles are codiªed into statutory law, 
but often they are not. In the criminal law area, common law has 
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mostly given way to statutory law, in great part because of the notion 
that a person has a right to know what is legal and what is not when 
she commits an act, and this is best done by writing it down spe-
ciªcally in the statute books. This transition also grew from the notion 
that the legislative branch ought to be involved in deªning what con-
stitutes a crime. 
 The concept of binding precedent, or stare decisis, plays an impor-
tant role in common law regimes. Successive courts look to their own 
prior decisions and the decisions of courts higher in the judicial hierar-
chy and, unless distinguishable, follow them. Higher courts overturn 
their own prior rulings only after extra careful deliberation, usually on 
the ground that intervening events or unintended consequences have 
shown the earlier decisions to be misbegotten. 
 On the other hand, international courts and “hybrid” courts— 
deªned here as courts combining national and international judges, 
prosecutors, and law—gain their legitimacy by proclaiming that they 
are bound in their rulings by international law. For the criminal 
courts established thus far that means international humanitarian law 
(the law of war) that is found mainly in treaties, such as the Hague 
and Geneva Conventions and Protocols, but even more critically for 
the tribunals, in “customary law,” those practices that states accept as 
obligatory in their relationships with other states and, in some cases, 
with their own citizens. 
 All international courts explicitly endorse the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege (no crime unless the law says so). In some instances that 
means ªnding the source of the prohibition in customary law when the 
parties are not citizens of states which have ratiªed the relevant treaties, 
or when the tribunal charters themselves were enacted after the alleg-
edly criminal acts took place. Thus, Koª Annan announced, at the time 
of the adoption of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), that “the international tribunal should apply rules 
of international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of 
customary law so that the problem of adherence of some but not all 
States to speciªc conventions does not arise.”1
 The constraints of customary law are less rigid on some of the 
other tribunals. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) deals with crimes emanating from a civil war and the applica-
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tion of the entire body of international humanitarian law to internal 
conºicts is less comprehensive, and, in some cases, still uncertain. Hy-
brid courts are allowed, in many instances by their charters, to resort to 
national as well as international law, which provides potential elbow 
room in close cases. The embryonic International Criminal Court 
(ICC) is the offspring of the Rome Treaty, and its judges will place the 
greatest emphasis on interpreting their own statute and its elaborate 
allied document that lists the Elements of the Crimes within its jurisdic-
tion. Additionally, the ICC only has jurisdiction over crimes committed 
after it came into being in July 2002, so few questions are likely to arise 
as to whether the statutory provisions can be applied retroactively. Arti-
cle 21 of the Rome Statute sets up its own hierarchy of interpretive 
sources: its Statute, Elements, and Rules lead the list; followed by trea-
ties and principles or rules of international law; general principles of 
law derived from national systems, if not inconsistent with the statute or 
international principles; and ªnally its own prior decisions. 
 The hunt for customary law is not always easy for international 
courts: it is uncodiªed, though a recent exercise by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has made a valiant effort to com-
pile state practices on major issues of international humanitarian law 
and even to derive black letter guiding principles.2 But judges may and 
do differ on when the behavior of a majority of “civilized” states dem-
onstrates that a particular norm qualiªes as customary law. As Theodor 
Meron, the former President of the ICTY, points out in a recent article, 
international courts have not had the time or resources to conduct 
searching inquiries into state practices, and have mostly accepted the 
“distillation” of those practices contained in other courts’ decisions or 
in conventions—secondary sources—as their basis.3 Critics of interna-
tional law as a controlling factor in U.S. policies—and there are many— 
scoff that customary law—amorphous and inaccessible as it is—is no 
“law” at all. 
 Yet the requirement that a dispositive principle or interpretation 
underlying a ruling of the court must be based on customary law has 
permeated the jurisprudence of the ICTY and certainly imposed 
genuine restraints on how its law has developed. Time permits only 
mention of a few examples, but Theodor Meron’s insightful article 
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provides many others. Among the crucial issues in which the iden-
tiªcation of customary law, or its absence, has been controlling or im-
portant are: the nexus between crimes against humanity and armed 
conºict (the ICTY’s charter requires the nexus; no other tribunal 
does); the need for discriminatory intent as an element of all crimes 
against humanity, not just persecution; the requirement that crimes 
against humanity be committed pursuant to a speciªc plan or policy; 
the requirement that torture be committed by a state-afªliated perpe-
trator; the requirement that genocide involve the intent to physically 
or biologically destroy the protected group, not just eradicate its cul-
ture; and that duress is a defense to killing innocent civilians, not just 
a mitigating factor in punishment. 
 There have, however, been times when the judges did not agree 
on whether the lack of customary law on a speciªc point should ban a 
ruling they believed was justiªed by the “objective and purpose” of 
agreed-upon principles of customary law. Judge Shahabudeen ex-
plained his view that if the “very essence” of an offense had been con-
demned in customary law, that was enough to permit the court to ex-
pand its application to situations not covered in prior customary law, 
if the current applications were reasonably foreseeable and furthered 
the basic principles of the customary law provision.4 Otherwise, the 
tribunals would be prevented from contributing to the progressive 
development of the law, even if that development results in criminaliz-
ing new conduct. Other judges, including Theodor Meron, worry that 
such an “approach . . . would afªrmatively engage the criminal tribu-
nal in the development of customary law, rather than simply in its appli-
cation” and so violate the legality principle of nullum crimen.5
 The crux of the dispute—when in the process of deciding if an 
accused has committed a violation of international humanitarian law 
and when customary law validation is required—basically involves the 
same issue American legal scholars and politicians are continually 
ªghting about: when does a court simply interpret or apply existing 
law and when does it “legislate” or create new law? The ICTY has not 
developed, anymore than we have at home, a clear formula for draw-
ing that line. Meron, for example, admits that established norms of 
customary law must often be applied to situations which the original 
consensus principles may not have contemplated, but cautions that 
the court, in making such applications, must be “very certain” of what 
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the basic principles require.6 On the other hand, these tribunals are 
now the chief interpreters of customary law and customary law itself 
grows and evolves through its capacity to embrace new dilemmas and 
situations. Too static a judicial mode of interpretation can positively 
contribute to the stratiªcation of the customary law as well. It is fair to 
say that the international tribunals have not satisfactorily resolved this 
tension. 
 Two examples illustrate this tension. In one case, the court 
agreed that command responsibility—the concept that a superior of-
ªcer is responsible for the crimes of his subordinates if he knew or 
should have known of their commission or if he did not seek their 
punishment afterward—was an accepted principle in customary law. 
But the ICTY judges split as to whether command responsibility cov-
ered a situation where the ofªcer had not yet taken command but was 
about to do so within hours.7
 The second example involves deportation, which all tribunal char-
ters since Nuremberg have listed as a crime against humanity if part of 
a systematic, widespread campaign against civilians. Deportation has 
historically been deªned to mean expelling persons from a state. In 
many current internal conºicts, however, one side may forcibly transfer 
civilians from one part of a country to another, not across national 
boundaries. The harm and disruption to the victim obviously is similar, 
if not identical, to inter-state transfers. The issue of whether forcible 
transfers inside a country could be covered in a prosecution for depor-
tation under a more liberal interpretation of that term arose in several 
ICTY proceedings. The court’s answer was no: forcible transfer might 
itself be a customary law violation (it is speciªcally banned in the Rome 
Statute), but there was no basis in customary law for reading it into the 
ban against deportation.8 One judge has opined that the objective and 
purpose of the two are the same and inclusion of forcible transfer into 
the crime of deportation was a logical extension mandated by the new 
forms of old violations the perpetrators had committed. 9 His remains a 
solitary voice. 
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 The U.N.-afªliated international courts, especially the ICTY, have 
felt constrained from developing the law of war in what we know as a 
typically common law fashion. Ephemeral as the concept of custom-
ary law seems to many, it has acted as a brake—some think too much 
so—to these courts. This may not prove equally true for the ICC, 
which will be working with a far more detailed statute. 
II. The Soft Law of the Tribunal 
 Since I am at heart a legal realist, I was interested during my ten-
ure at the ICTY not just to learn about the law ensconced in the for-
mal judgments of the court, but about the myriad of less formal rules 
and practices which frequently have just as much or more impact on 
the ªnal outcomes of cases. Some of this “below the radar” law is for-
malized in the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which at 
the ICTY is determined by the judges in plenary session. By contrast, 
at the ICC the Assembly of State Parties (the Rome Statute ratiªers) 
must approve the Rules. Vital parts of the court’s operational practice 
are also developed in its non-judicial units, such as the Victim and 
Witness’ Unit, which safeguards crucial witnesses whose safety is at 
risk. Both sources of “soft” law and practice have been indispensable 
to the survival of the ICTY and ICTR, and have been intensively 
mined by more recently established courts for “best practices” replica-
tion. Prosecutorial norms and guidelines may turn out to be even 
more inºuential in the overall record of these courts than the juris-
prudence. The prosecutors in these courts have enormous discretion 
on whom to charge, with what, and when; in recent years, it was the 
Ofªce of the Prosecutor, for instance, that introduced a negotiated 
guilty plea regime into the ICTY. As far as transfer of these Rules and 
practices from one court to another, the criteria is fundamentally 
pragmatic—a question of whether the criteria has worked, rather than 
whether its roots can be found in customary law. This less visible facet 
of court operations is entirely familiar to students of our national 
courts and is, in my view, embedded in all courts’ DNA. 
A. The Tribunal’s Rules 
 First, let’s talk about the preeminent role of the Tribunal’s Rules; 
their content, candidly, often cannot be easily distinguished from the 
substantive law found in judicial opinions, especially when, as with the 
ICTY, the judges are the authors of both. The U.N.-afªliated courts 
are required by charter to conform to basic principles of the Interna-
tional Compact on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), itself accepted 
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as customary law, including: notice to the accused of the charges; de-
fense counsel, appointed if necessary (well over ninety percent of 
ICTY defendants get appointed counsel); access by the accused to the 
evidence against them; public trial; the right to mount a defense; and 
protection from self-incrimination. Of course, no Compact or Charter 
can cover all the issues that arise in year-long trials, and the Rules at 
the ICTY have served as a vehicle for ªlling the gaps. The Rules have 
been amended dozens of times in their ªfteen-year history. The re-
cent rules on guilty pleas and prosecutors’ recommendations for re-
duced sentences are an example. Virtually all of the extensive prac-
tices of pretrial discovery and pretrial status conferences, as well as 
the treatment of detainees and convicted prisoners, were brought into 
being through Rule additions. 
 Perhaps the most prominent area of Tribunal law dominated by 
Rule changes involves the gradual substitution of written evidence for 
live testimony, especially as it pertains to witness statements. This is with 
no doubt a critical issue in many proceedings because witnesses can sel-
dom be forced to come to the Tribunal; it has no police force to enforce 
its summonses. Many, if not most, witnesses would prefer to stay home 
and have their out-of-court statements read into the record. In the be-
ginning, the Tribunal Rules expressed an explicit preference for live 
testimony even though Rule 89 did not bar hearsay, but rather allowed 
“any relevant evidence [the court] deems to have probative value.”10 
Depositions were also permitted under special circumstances. The Ap-
peals Chamber initially interpreted the Rules to require speciªc indicia 
of reliability for admission of written witness statements, which were to 
be the exception, not the rule. Under the press of backlogs and pres-
sure for more expeditious trials, in 2001 the court amended its Rules to 
allow written evidence to prove background, historical, or peripheral 
facts so long as the written statements did not purport to concern the 
role or conduct of the accused as to the charges being tried. Transcripts 
of testimony in prior proceedings could also be introduced subject to 
demands for cross-examination if a new line of questioning was justiªed. 
Perhaps most revealing, the original preference for live testimony was 
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dropped altogether.11 Still restive, the prosecution and some judges 
would be hospitable to more inroads through the Rules for written tes-
timony in lieu of live witnesses. If there are future changes, it will as 
likely be through Rule changes as through judicial opinions. 
 A special Rule on Gender Crimes, Rule 96 in the ICTY Rules, has 
been picked up by all the other Tribunals, relatively unchanged, and 
is another example of Rule-based law which might not meet strict cus-
tomary law standards.12 The Rule was pushed strongly by interna-
tional women’s groups and sets out liberal standards for doing away 
with the corroboration requirements of gender crimes and tightly 
cabins any consent defense to such crimes. 
 A third area in which the Rules have been amended and have sub-
stantively affected the law is pretrial release. Nothing is said about pre-
trial release in the ICTY Statute and the original Rule contained a 
strong presumption against pretrial release, authorizing it only in “ex-
ceptional circumstances.” Only a few defendants were released in the 
ªrst several years and then only for humanitarian reasons. As the num-
ber of detainees grew and the length of their detentions raised con-
cerns about violation of human rights, the Rules were amended to de-
lete the “exceptional” requirement. The granting of pretrial and even 
pre-appeal release has grown perceptibly, now encompassing dozens of 
defendants, including those of the highest rank. 
 Apart from Rules-based tribunal “common law,” there are other 
areas where judges do not feel bound by customary law and in which 
they more freely act with discretion. Sentencing comes most quickly 
to mind. The ICTY and ICTR Statutes and Rules give scant direction 
to sentencing; the ICTY Charter rules out capital punishment (as do 
all U.N.-related courts), but authorizes sentences ranging from one 
day to life. The court, in its Charter, was told to “take account” of sen-
tencing in the former Yugoslavia, but was obviously not bound by that 
admonition; otherwise, it was told to consider the gravity of the crime 
and mitigating and aggravating factors, but such factors were not 
listed anywhere. Early on, the Tribunal rejected the notion of any sen-
tencing tariff based on a hierarchy of the four basic crimes (genocide, 
aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity). 
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 I regret to say that—even with the considerable leeway given— 
the ICTY has not yet arrived at a discernible common law of sentenc-
ing any more than pre-Sentencing Guidelines U.S. courts did. Victim 
groups generally complain the sentences are too low; they are un-
happy, too, with the even lower sentences resulting from guilty pleas 
when the perpetrator provides information or testimony against other 
indictees. Only a few life sentences have been given and some surmise 
that until the two most prominent fugitives, Ratko Mladic and Rado-
van Karadzic, have been captured, judges fear to dilute the currency 
of their highest penalty. There has been confusion, too, on the court 
and off, over the application of cumulative sentencing—how many 
cumulative sentences can be given when convictions on several differ-
ent counts arise from the same acts? The Appeals Chamber itself of-
ten revises sentences of the trial court up or down, not always on cle-
ar-cut criteria. Life sentences are more common in the ICTR, perhaps 
because the Rwandan courts, where thousands of war crime perpetra-
tors have been, or will be, tried, retain the death penalty, and that gap 
in punishment potential has provoked local criticism of the interna-
tional court as too soft on the genocidieres. 
 In short, no principled common law of sentencing has emerged 
from the Tribunals, and it is interesting that the ICC has chosen to 
incorporate in its Charter and Rules greater guidance on sentencing 
criteria—listing mitigating and aggravating circumstances (drawing 
on ICTY and ICTR opinions for the list) and setting up a dividing line 
between sentences of up to thirty years and life sentences. Special pro-
cedures are required for the latter, which must be speciªcally justiªed 
by the gravity and circumstances of the crime. 
III. The Pathways of Tribunal “Common Law” 
 There can be little doubt that even within the constraints of cus-
tomary law adherence, tribunal law has exploded quantitatively and 
qualitatively. The pathways for its development and reªnement across 
court boundaries are not, however, the same as in national court sys-
tems. International courts are not part of a hierarchical judicial system 
where higher courts can supervise and, if needed, overturn lower 
courts; neither is there a popularly elected legislature to codify or pro-
spectively change rulings made by the courts. It is true international 
and hybrid courts have Appeals Chambers which can revise or reverse 
trial court holdings, but one court has no say over another’s jurispru-
dence. Recurrent suggestions that the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) be given a ªnal say over other U.N.-afªliated courts have been 
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rejected and the various courts do, on occasion, differ and ºatly con-
tradict one another. 
 Most scholars are sanguine about the “let a thousand ºowers 
bloom” status of international criminal jurisprudence, though some 
have offered sensible suggestions about voluntary comity guidelines to 
minimize the contradictions. Hybrid courts, which administer both in-
ternational and domestic law, may be pulled in the direction of harmo-
nizing the two, though it is interesting that the Iraqi Special Tribunal 
was speciªcally instructed in its enabling law to consult international 
court interpretations of the basic international crimes.13
 In sum, one court’s jurisprudence must rely on the persuasive-
ness of its reasoning, supplemented by the critiques of academics and 
international law scholars, if it is to be picked up by other courts. As 
another route to convergence, there are out-of-court exchanges in 
person and on paper between judges and practitioners in different 
tribunals, as well as common training for the prosecutors and defense 
counsel to insure that they know other courts’ jurisprudence and have 
an opportunity to probe its attractions or deªciencies. 
 One circumstance militating toward coherence of doctrine is the 
fact that the authorizing laws of all international and hybrid courts de-
ªne the same four basic genres of international crimes in basically the 
same way. There are minor differences, but in general the similar 
deªnitions provide an umbrella framework for interpretations that do 
not allow for radical departures. No new genres of international hu-
manitarian violations have been articulated—war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Convention, and genocide are 
“it.” Thus, rulings of one court are bound to be relevant to others. This 
is not to say that under the genre deªnitions there have not been new 
additions of the kind of actions that qualify for inclusion in the master 
headings: disappearances and apartheid have been added to the list of 
crimes against humanity; and rape has been explicitly listed as a war 
crime and crime against humanity. Sexual slavery, forced sterilization, 
and forced prostitution were ªrst prosecuted under the rubric “other 
inhumane acts,” but were later added to the formal list of war crimes in 
the Rome Statute. On the other hand, the deªnition of genocide, de-
spite its difªculties in application to new forms of mass murders in the 
Balkans and in Darfur, has remained virtually untouched for fear that 
the Genocide Convention’s half-century struggle for ratiªcation might 
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be undone if the amendment process required it be gone through 
again. 
 There is also ample evidence that some of the Tribunal jurispru-
dence has been rejected by the drafters of the Rome Statute and its 
Elements and Rules. For example, contrary to ICTY rulings which held 
that genocide can be committed by a single individual and does not 
require a state plan or policy, the Rome Element of Crime insists that 
there must be proof in a prosecution for genocide that the conduct 
took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct di-
rected against the protected group, or that the conduct involved could 
by itself affect the destruction of the group. As aforementioned, the 
ICC has chosen to spell out in far greater detail criteria and procedures 
for sentencing rather than depend almost entirely on judges’ discre-
tion. 
 On the heated issue of duress as a defense to a war crime or 
crime against humanity, the ICC-written law has chosen to follow the 
dissent of ICTY President Antonio Cassesse rather than the ICTY ma-
jority in supporting such a defense. This example, incidentally, rein-
forces for me the value of dissent in a rapidly moving international 
jurisprudence. Originally, some scholars thought dissents should not 
be allowed in order to preserve the cloak of unity. Time has, I believe, 
shown that in international courts, as well as national ones, dissent is 
especially vital and particularly useful when precedent does not rule 
out choices for later courts, and yet there may be few, if any, rulings in 
different courts for newly-constituted courts to choose from. 
 My main point is that so far Tribunal “common law” has devel-
oped horizontally across courts by persuasion and vertically by culmi-
nation in the ICC’s written law. The ICC drafters have cherry-picked 
what seemed to them the best rulings and practices from the earlier 
courts and discarded those that did not meet their standard. It is in-
teresting that this pathway is not dissimilar from the gradual trans-
formative journey of the common law into statutory law in our own 
country. So far, the ICC law is much more extensively written down 
(see, for example, the long list of speciªc rules on admissibility of par-
ticular kinds of evidence) and though the judges will certainly add to 
the body of law once their cases start going, their rulings may be more 
focused on interpreting the written law than on ªnding customary law 
to justify their rulings. 
 Given the pathway from early courts to later ones, and the nu-
merous examples of how the ICTY and ICTR have provided experi-
ence and choices for the ICC, it has to be a cause for concern that all 
of the earlier international courts, and most of the hybrid courts, are 
26 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 30:15 
scheduled to go out of business within a few years. New ones may arise 
but are apt to be of limited duration. National courts may pick up 
some of the slack, but can be expected to show sharper variations in 
jurisprudence reºecting a greater input of local law. Thus, while the 
ICC will be the ºagship of international humanitarian law, it is less 
clear where the grist for its mill will come from—the percolation 
process may have largely dried up. In this respect, a monopoly juris-
prudence is perhaps more to be feared than the more familiar spectre 
of too many voices at odds with one another. Some competition may 
be a good thing for international, as well as national, tribunals. 
 The demise of the early courts will produce many problems. Logis-
tically there is the problem of what to do with their records so that fu-
ture courts can access them to evaluate the value of their judgments. 
There is also a scholarly task of sorting their good work from the less 
good. These courts have produced remarkable feats of creative and 
sensitive judging, but in some cases, the jurisprudence has been un-
even; not all the judges have had judicial or practitioner backgrounds, 
and some of the judges have not recognized the legitimate limits of 
even customary law. Unlike national courts, the early international 
courts will not be given the time to mature their jurisprudence, to cor-
rect midstream mistakes, and to arrive at seasoned rationales. Someone 
else may have to do that job for them. 
 The importance of the development of international law by in-
ternational courts will and should continue. Many national courts in-
creasingly cite to international court law in their own work and as the 
ICC works into a full schedule of cases, the complimentary doctrine 
will require that states which want to do their own investigations and 
prosecutions in order to defeat ICC jurisdiction be able and willing to 
draft national laws dealing with international crimes. An increase in 
national prosecutions—universal jurisdiction may also account for 
additional cases—will likely involve looking at the international court 
cases for guidance and a safe harbor. The ICC—without U.S. partici-
pation, I note—may have to bear this burden of advancing interna-
tional humanitarian law in the courts alone. 
IV. Concluding Thoughts 
 Over the past ªfteen years, a group of international and hybrid 
courts have produced an impressive body of international humanitar-
ian law, as well as the ªrst concerted attempt at applying it to a myriad 
of fact situations since Nuremberg. Although the ICTY, the ICTR, and 
the Sierra Leone courts have ºown the ºag of customary law, many 
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new doctrines have grown up and many new fact situations have been 
accommodated under old labels and rubrics. The Tribunals’ Rules 
and operational practices have supplied additional opportunities to 
improvise and experiment. The Tribunals have looked to each other’s 
work and the new ICC has adopted in written form what its drafters 
considered the best rulings and practices of the earlier courts. 
 When these courts die, the ICC will lose an important source 
upon which to draw for substantive and procedural guidance. It is 
probably not a good thing for international law to have a monopoly 
court. Academics and court watchers will have to be especially vigilant 
and productive in their critique of ICC work product to help that 
court fulªll its paramount function. 
